Islamic Fundamentalism
| I | INTRODUCTION |
Islamic
Fundamentalism, diverse political and social movements in Muslim
countries of North Africa, the Middle East, and South Asia that have as their
goal the creation of more Islamically oriented states and societies based on the
principles and values of Islam.
For many people in the West, the term “Islamic
fundamentalism” evokes images of hostage crises, embassies under siege,
hijackings, and suicide bombers. But these images hardly present a comprehensive
picture. While some Islamic militants try to reach their goals through violence,
the majority of Islamic activists work within mainstream society, participating
in the electoral process. The ranks of Islamic fundamentalists include members
of non-governmental Muslim organizations that provide much-needed services to
the poor through Islamic schools, medical clinics, social welfare agencies, and
other institutions. At the fringes are extremist groups like the al-Qaeda
network of Saudi-born millionaire Osama bin Laden that engage in a global war of
terrorism.
The reassertion of Islam and Islamic values in
Muslim politics and society over the past 30 years is often referred to in the
West as the rise of Islamic fundamentalism. However, the word
fundamentalism, which originated in Christianity, can be misleading when
it is used to describe Islam or Muslim countries. The conservative monarchy of
Saudi Arabia, the radical socialist state of Libya, and clerically governed Iran
have all been described as “fundamentalist,” but this description fails to take
into account vast differences in their governments and policies. Political
analysts prefer to use the expressions “political Islam” or “Islamism” when
discussing Islam’s many-faceted roles in current social and political
movements.
| II | ISLAM AND POLITICS |
Like Judaism and Christianity, Islam
originated in the Middle East. Adherents of all three religions are considered
to be the children of Abraham. Muslims believe that God (Allah in Arabic) sent
his revelation first to Moses (through the Hebrew scriptures, the Torah), then
to Jesus (through the Gospels of the Christian Bible), and finally to Muhammad
(through the Islamic scriptures, the Qur'an). Islam is based on the Qur'an and
the example of the prophet Muhammad, who Muslims believe is the last of God’s
prophets.
Islam’s involvement with politics dates back
to its beginnings with the founding of a community-state in Medina by Muhammad
in the 7th century ad. Under the
political leadership of Muhammad and his successors, known as caliphs (see
Caliphate), Islam expanded from its point of origin in what is now Saudi
Arabia into Islamic empires and cultures that extend across North Africa,
through the Middle East, and into Asia and Europe (see Spread of Islam).
Islam today claims more than 1.3 billion followers, more than any religion
except Christianity.
Islam has exercised considerable political and
social influence throughout its history. Early rulers in the Middle East and
elsewhere claimed legitimacy for their authority in the name of Islam, and
Islamic teachings gave structure to almost every facet of society. But these
early Muslim states and empires were not theocracies—that is, governments ruled
by religious leaders or clergy—until the creation of the Islamic Republic of
Iran in 1979.
| A | The Resurgence of Political Islam |
The causes of Islam’s resurgence vary by
country and region, but there are several common threads. Among these is a
widespread feeling of failure and loss of self-esteem in many Muslim societies.
Most Middle Eastern and North African countries achieved independence from
colonial rule by the mid-20th century, but the expectations that accompanied
independence were shattered by failed political systems and economies and the
negative effects of modernization. Characterizing many of the newly independent
Muslim nations were autocratic leaders, repressive governments, overcrowded
cities with insufficient social support systems, high unemployment rates,
government corruption, and a growing gap between rich and poor.
Many Muslims blamed Western models of
political and economic development for these failures. Once enthusiastically
pursued as symbols of modernity, these models increasingly came under criticism.
Modernization, a process of Westernization and secularization of society, was
seen as responsible for an excessive dependence on the West; for a weakening of
traditional family, religious, and social values; and for a loss of identity
that contributed to the breakdown of Muslim society. Consequently, many
countries became disillusioned with the West, and in particular with the United
States. United States support for authoritarian Muslim rulers such as Iran’s
Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlavi, as well as what was seen as America’s uncritical
support for Israel, strengthened anti-Western feelings.
Israel’s crushing victory over its Muslim
neighbors in the 1967 Six-Day War became a symbol of this sense of failure.
After defeating the combined forces of several Arab nations, Israel seized
conquered territory from Egypt, Syria, and Jordan. The loss of Jerusalem, the
third holiest city of Islam, was particularly devastating to Muslims around the
world.
The Islamic revival has affected both the
private and public lives of Muslims. Many Muslims have become more religiously
observant, attending mosque, fasting, wearing Islamic dress, emphasizing family
values, and abstaining from alcohol and gambling. Publicly, the revival has
manifested itself in the form of Islamic banks, religious programming in the
media, a proliferation of religious literature, and the emergence of new Islamic
associations dedicated to political and social reform.
As Islamic symbols, slogans, ideology, and
organizations became prominent fixtures in Muslim politics in the 1970s and
1980s, Egypt’s Anwar al-Sadat, Libya’s Muammar Qaddafi, Pakistan’s General
Muhammad Zia ul-Haq, and other government leaders appealed to Islam in order to
enhance their legitimacy and authority and to mobilize popular support.
Movements in opposition to the government in Afghanistan, Egypt, Iran, Saudi
Arabia, and other countries did the same.
The most successful Islamic opposition
movement culminated in the establishment of the Islamic Republic of Iran in
1979. Throughout the 1980s, Iran inspired antigovernment protests in Kuwait and
Bahrain, and helped create Islamic militias, such as Lebanon’s Hezbollah (Party
of God) and Islamic Jihad, both of which were involved in hijackings and
hostage-takings. These acts, combined with the 1981 assassination of Egypt’s
president Sadat by religious extremists, contributed to the image of a
monolithic radical Islamic “fundamentalist” threat to governments in the Muslim
world and the West.
Distinguishing between moderate Islamic
groups that participate within society and violent revolutionaries is critical
to understanding the resurgence of Islam. Many opponents of political Islam have
charged that all Islamic movements are extremist groups that seek to “hijack
democracy” and manipulate the political system in order to gain power and impose
their will. Some experts argue that this type of reaction contributes to the
radicalization of moderate Islamists.
| B | Beliefs Behind Political Islam |
A number of beliefs and assumptions lie at
the heart of the Islamic political revival. The first of these is that the
Muslim world is in a state of decline, and the cause of this decline is
departure from the straight path of Islam. The cure, therefore, is a return to
Islam in personal and public life, which will ensure the restoration of Islamic
identity, values, and power. Moreover, Islam is a total or comprehensive way of
life as stipulated in the Qur'an, mirrored in the example of Muhammad and the
first Muslim community-state organized by Muhammad at Medina, and embodied in
the comprehensive nature of the Sharia (Islamic law). Thus, the renewal and
revitalization of Muslim governments and societies require the restoration or
reimplementation of Islamic law, which provides the blueprint for an Islamically
guided and socially just state and society.
Although political Islam condemns the
Westernization and secularization of society, it does not condemn modernization
as such. Science and technology are accepted, but the pace, direction, and
extent of change are to be subordinated to Islamic belief and values in order to
guard against the penetration of and excessive dependence on Western
values.
| C | Beliefs of the Radical Minority |
While the majority of Islamic activists
seek to work within the system and bring about change from within society, a
relatively small but significant radical extremist minority believe they have a
mandate from God to carry out God’s will. This extremist minority further
believes that because the rulers in the Muslim world are authoritarian and
anti-Islamic, violent change is necessary. They seek to topple governments,
seize power, and impose their vision or interpretation of Islam upon
society.
Radical Islamic movements often operate on
the assumption that Islam and the West are locked in an ongoing battle that
reaches back to the early days of Islam, a battle that has been heavily
influenced by the legacy of the Crusades and European colonialism, and that
today is the product of a Judeo-Christian conspiracy. This conspiracy, they
believe, is the result of superpower neocolonialism and the power of Zionism
(support for a Jewish nation, now the state of Israel). These radical movements
blame the West (Britain, France, and especially the United States) for its
support of un-Islamic or unjust regimes and biased support for Israel in the
face of the displacement of the Palestinian people (see Palestine). Thus,
violence against such governments and their representatives as well as Western
multinationals is regarded as legitimate self-defense.
Islamic radicals also believe that Islam is
not simply an ideological alternative for Muslim societies but a theological and
political imperative. Because it is God’s command, implementation must be
immediate, not gradual, and the obligation to implement is incumbent on all true
Muslims. Therefore, those who hesitate, remain apolitical, or resist—individuals
and governments—are no longer to be regarded as Muslims. They are atheists or
unbelievers, enemies of God, against whom all true Muslims must wage holy war in
the form of jihad.
| III | THE FACES OF POLITICAL ISLAM TODAY |
In the early 21st century, Islam remains a
major presence and political force throughout the Muslim world. The question is
not whether Islam has a place and role in society, but how best for it to assume
that role. While some Muslims wish to pursue a more secular path, others call
for a more visible role of Islam in public life. The majority of Islamic
activists and movements function and participate within society. A distinct
minority are radical extremists who attempt to destabilize or overthrow
governments and commit acts of violence and terrorism within their
countries.
During the late 1980s and the 1990s Islamic
political organizations began to participate in elections, when allowed, and to
provide much-needed educational and social services in a number of countries.
Headed by educated laity rather than the clergy, these Islamic organizations
attracted a broad spectrum of members, from professionals and technocrats to the
uneducated and poor. Candidates with an Islamic orientation were elected to high
office in several countries. In Turkey, the leader of the Islamist Welfare Party
held the office of prime minister from 1996 to 1997. In Malaysia, Anwar Ibrahim,
a founder of the Malaysian Islamic Youth Movement (ABIM), served as deputy prime
minister from 1993 until his dismissal in a power struggle in 1998. In the first
democratic elections in Indonesia, Abdurrahman Wahid, leader of perhaps the
largest Islamic movement, the Nahdlatul Ulama, was elected president in 1999.
But popular support for him eroded as Indonesia’s economic problems worsened.
Wahid was removed from office in 2001 after the national legislature unanimously
voted to impeach him and replace him with the vice president, Megawati
Sukarnoputri.
Although the primary catalysts and concerns
of most Islamic movements have been domestic or national, international issues
also have shaped Muslim politics. Among the more influential issues have been
Palestinian-Israeli conflict and Israel’s occupation of East Jerusalem; the
Soviet occupation of Afghanistan during the 1980s (see Soviet-Afghan
War); the devastating impact of United Nations (UN) sanctions against Iraq on
hundreds of thousands of Iraqi civilians, especially children, following the
Persian Gulf War (1991); forceful efforts to suppress Muslims in Bosnia,
Chechnya, and Kashmīr; and the U.S.-British invasion and occupation of Iraq,
beginning in 2003 (see U.S.-Iraq War). In addition, countries such as
Iran, Libya, and Saudi Arabia have sought to extend their influence
internationally by supporting government Islamization programs as well as
Islamist movements elsewhere.
A review of the current situation in key
areas of North Africa, the Middle East, and Southwestern Asia indicates the
directions and diverse forms that Muslim politics has taken during recent
decades.
| A | Tunisia |
Until the late 1980s analysts believed
that North Africa, like Turkey, was beyond the reach of any serious challenge
from Islamic activism. Tunisia had had one-man rule after gaining independence
from France in 1957; Habib Bourguiba served as the country’s president from 1957
to 1987. In 1987 Tunisia’s prime minister Zine al-Abidine Ben Ali seized power
from Bourguiba, who had been declared senile. Ben Ali, like Bourguiba, insisted
on taking a tough stance against Islamists.
Ben Ali promised democratization and held
parliamentary elections in 1989. Islamic candidates won 14.5 percent of the vote
nationwide and a stunning 30 percent in several cities. The Tunisian government
responded by suppressing the most effective Islamic opposition movement,
Ennahda, through widespread arrests and trials held before specially created
military courts. International human rights organizations strongly criticized
these repressive actions. The government’s brief flirtation with democratization
came to an end as President Ben Ali in 1994 and 1999 won reelection by 99
percent of the vote.
Tunisia’s constitution was amended in
2002 to enable Ben Ali to seek a fourth term in 2004 and a fifth term in 2009.
Ben Ali was reelected in 2004 with more than 90 percent of the vote, after the
opposition withdrew from the elections so as not to legitimize “a one-party
state with a facade of democracy.”
| B | Algeria |
Whereas the Tunisian government
decapitated the Islamic movement, driving its leaders into exile or underground,
in Algeria the military set in motion an escalating spiral of indiscriminate
violence and counterviolence. Under its constitution Algeria had single-party
rule by the National Liberation Front (Front de Libération Nationale, FLN), the
group that won Algeria’s independence from France in 1962. A revised
constitution in 1989 permitted other political parties to challenge the FLN.
That year the Islamic Salvation Front (FIS) became North Africa’s first legal
Islamic political party.
Led by a university professor, Shaykh Ali
Abbasi al-Madani, the FIS flourished as the FLN-led government failed to resolve
Algeria’s social and economic problems. Through mosques and an effective social
welfare network, the FIS built a national organization and emerged as the
strongest opposition party. Substantial support for FIS came from the
unemployed, at a time when Algeria’s unemployment rate had surpassed 30 percent,
and from socially marginalized youths. But FIS supporters also included
small-business owners and prosperous merchants, civil servants, university
professors, physicians, lawyers, and other professionals
In 1990 Algeria held local elections, its
first multiparty election since independence. The FIS captured 55 percent of the
vote, and it scored an even more surprising victory in 1992 in the first round
of parliamentary elections, winning 188 seats, and appeared to be on its way to
winning an absolute majority in the second round. As Islamists celebrated the
first round of elections, the Algerian military intervened, canceled elections,
and forced the resignation of Algeria’s president. The military arrested more
FIS leaders, outlawed the FIS, seized FIS assets, and imprisoned more than
10,000 Algerians in desert camps. These actions led to a protracted civil war in
which the majority of Algerians found themselves caught between extremist
factions. On one side were hardline military and security forces whose only
strategy was the eradication of Islamism; on the other, the equally
uncompromising radical Armed Islamic Group.
Brutality and bloodshed, which claimed
the lives of some 150,000 Algerians, continued into the late 1990s and early
2000s. The FIS was excluded from the 1997 elections for the National Assembly
(lower house of the Algerian legislature), but two other Islamically oriented
parties together won 107 of the 380 seats. Presidential elections in 1999 were
flawed by the last-minute withdrawal of all six opposition candidates, who
charged that the military had rigged the elections.
Abdelaziz Bouteflika, elected president
in 1999 and reelected in 2004, brought relative stability to Algeria by
releasing imprisoned opposition leaders and granting amnesty to Islamist rebels.
In 2005 Algerians approved by referendum the president’s Charter on Peace and
National Reconciliation, which closed the chapter on a decade of violence. It
pardoned Islamist militants on the run or in prison as long as they renounce
violence, but it also protected Algeria’s army and security forces from bearing
responsibility for the thousands of people who “disappeared” after being
arrested. A series of terrorist bombings in late 2006 and early 2007 dispelled
Algerians’ hopes that the violence had finally ended. A new group claiming to
represent al-Qaeda in northern Africa took responsibility for the bombings and
hinted that it would attack again.
| C | Morocco |
A constitutional monarchy, Morocco has
been ruled by the same family since its independence in 1956. Mohammed VI
succeeded his father, Hassan II, as king in 1999. Mohammed VI was hailed as a
reformer and pushed through reforms in family law, economic liberalization, and
politics. Morocco’s parliamentary elections in 2002 were billed as Morocco’s
first freely contested elections since the country’s independence. The Islamist
Justice and Development Party (PJD) tripled its representation in parliament
from 14 seats to 42 seats after securing 13 percent of the vote.
In 2003 a series of suicide bomb attacks
in Casablanca killed 41 people and left more than 100 others injured. The PJD
kept a low profile afterward, fearing the government would use the attacks as a
pretext to crack down on the party. Although the PJD claimed not to be a
religious party, it was the only legal Islamic party in Morocco. The Islamist
movement in Morocco also comprises unauthorized Islamic associations and
numerous underground groups, including the Salafia Jihadia, which was blamed for
the Casablanca bombings.
| D | Egypt |
Political Islam in Egyptian society
includes a spectrum of organizations, from radical and violent to mainstream and
nonviolent. The Muslim Brotherhood gained strength during the 1970s under
Egypt’s president Anwar Sadat and began participating in the political process
during the 1980s under his successor, Hosni Mubarak. By the 1980s the Islamist
movement had split into those who advocated the violent overthrow of the
government in order to create an Islamic state and those who believed in
peaceful, grassroots organizing as the most effective way to establish an
Islamic society. The Muslim Brotherhood joined the latter, renouncing violence
and focusing their efforts on organizing among the poor.
Radical Islamic organizations, such as
Islamic Jihad and the Islamic Group (al-Gama’a al-Islamiyya), turned to violence
in the 1990s, attacking government officials, institutions, fellow Muslims,
Christians, and foreign tourists. Their goal was to destabilize and overthrow
the Egyptian government.
The Mubarak government launched a
counteroffensive against the radical groups, imprisoning more than 20,000
Islamists, many of them without charge. Military courts not subject to law were
created, and laws were enacted to restrict freedom of the press, take control of
mosques, and prevent elected Islamists from heading professional associations.
The slaughter of 58 foreign tourists at the historic town of Luxor in 1997
seemed to indicate the powerlessness of the government. By 2000, however, the
Mubarak government had gained the upper hand and weakened the radical
movements.
Despite the government’s apparent success
in containing Islamic radicalism, Egyptian society has become more Islamized by
moderate Islamists at the grassroots level. Young, university-educated
professionals preach to middle- and upper-class audiences. Physicians,
journalists, lawyers, and political scientists—male and female—speak out and
write on issues of Islamic reform, such as pluralism (different beliefs)
within Islam, women’s rights, and social justice for the poor. Islamic schools,
clinics, hospitals, and social services, as well as Islamic banks and publishing
houses, offer an alternative set of institutions and an indirect indictment of
the government’s inability to meet peoples’ needs. Elections in 2000 were the
first to be supervised by Egypt’s independent judiciary and thus free of the
ballot tampering that characterized previous elections. Although the Muslim
Brotherhood was banned from participating as a legal party, its members, running
independently or with other parties, won 17 of the 444 contested seats in the
legislature.
Egypt held its first-ever presidential
election with multiple candidates in 2005, a sign of short-lived optimism that
the country might be heading toward full democratic reform. Mubarak won a fifth
six-year term as Egypt’s president. He had promised sweeping reforms if he won,
including repeal of emergency laws that allow for arbitrary arrest and have been
in place since Mubarak came to power in 1981. Instead, the government extended
Egypt’s emergency laws for two more years. Furthermore, Mubarak’s closest
challenger in the elections, Ayman Nour, the leader of the liberal Al-Ghad
party, was thrown into jail, despite doctors’ pleas that he was dangerously
ill.
In subsequent parliamentary elections in
2005, the Muslim Brotherhood—outlawed since 1954—won an unprecedented 88 seats
in parliament (one-fifth of the seats), its largest gain since participating in
the political process. However, the Brotherhood’s candidates had to run as
independents because of the party’s illegal status. In recent years, its members
have been targeted by the state security services, arrested, and sometimes
tortured. Islamist leaders claim that the arrests were motivated by the
government’s desire to curb opposition in parliamentary elections in 2007. Many
of those arrested were likely contenders in the elections, according to the
Brotherhood’s leader.
| E | Iran |
In 1979 Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, an
aging, white-bearded Muslim cleric, came to power in Iran, having toppled
Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlavi, a modern ruler and close ally of the United States.
The Iranian revolution was the product of a long, slow buildup of opposition to
the shah, who came to power in 1941. In 1953 the shah was forced to flee the
country after a failed coup by supporters of Iran’s prime minister, Mohammad
Mosaddeq, whose efforts to nationalize Iran’s oil industry angered Great
Britain. Fearing that Iran might develop close ties with the Soviet Union as the
Cold War got under way, the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) spearheaded
another coup after the original failed and the shah was reinstated within a
week. The shah maintained a close relationship with the United States and Europe
afterward.
During the 1960s and 1970s, the shah used
his country’s enormous oil revenues to finance a modernization program. But the
reforms tended to benefit urban areas and the educated elite rather than Iran’s
thousands of rural villages. Opponents warned that the shah’s uncritical
economic, military, and cultural dependence on the West, referred to as
“Westoxification,” threatened Iranian identity, autonomy, and culture.
The Iranian revolution (1978-1979) was
supported by a broad-based alliance of religious and political opponents,
mobilized under the umbrella of Shia Islam, the dominant form of Islam in Iran.
An existing network of clergy, mosques, and seminaries in every city, town, and
village provided necessary organization and a means for communication and
mobilization of the people. Although the government had banned political
meetings, it could not close the mosques, where Iranians heard sermons
denouncing injustice and oppression. Khomeini, exiled in 1964 for criticizing
the shah, became a symbol of the opposition. As the shah’s military and security
forces responded with increased ferocity against opponents, the shah’s
unyielding stance transformed his opponents into revolutionaries. As a stunned
world looked on, the shah’s government fell. Khomeini returned from exile, and
the Islamic Republic of Iran was born.
Although many Iranians expected the clergy
would return to their mosques and seminaries soon after the revolution, Iran
became a clergy-governed state within a year. Khomeini sat at the apex of power
and served as the final authority on all domestic and international matters. He
silenced all effective opposition, secular and religious, and many Iranians fled
the country.
After Khomeini’s death in 1989, Iran
witnessed an expansion of political participation and dissent. Public discussion
and debate became more open, and the number of independent newspapers,
magazines, and journals grew significantly. But perhaps the most stunning
example of increased moderation and pluralism in Iran was the victory of Muslim
cleric Mohammed Khatami in Iran’s 1997 presidential election.
Widely seen as moderate and progressive,
Khatami pursued two major policies: creating a more open and tolerant society at
home and promoting dialogue with the West abroad. In 1998 Khatami proposed
cultural exchanges with the United States as a means of breaking down the “wall
of mistrust” between the two countries. As a result, Iran and the United States
embarked on more open communication and exchange.
In its third decade, the Islamic Republic
of Iran was locked in a struggle to redefine its political and economic future
at home and abroad. The 2004 legislative elections marked a defeat for Khatami’s
reformist movement. Since then, the Majlis (legislative assembly) has been
dominated by a conservative coalition, chiefly the Developers of Islamic Iran.
That alliance was made up of the “second generation” of the Islamic
revolution—men and women who had been in their 20s and 30s when Khomeini came to
power and who defended the values of Ayatollah Seyed Ali Khamenei, Iran’s
supreme spiritual leader.
In the 2005 presidential elections,
Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, a Khamenei loyalist, was elected with the backing of the
Developers of Islamic Iran, his main political base. Domestic supporters and
critics alike soon became weary of Ahmadinejad’s fiery rhetoric, which placed
Iran under the threat of a military attack by the United States. Some Iranians
blamed Ahmadinejad’s provocative statements for the UN’s passage of economic
sanctions against Iran late in 2006. Iran also rejected UN demands to halt its
program to develop nuclear fuel. Further criticism of Ahmadinejad, at home and
abroad, followed his hosting of a Holocaust-denial conference in Iran in
2006.
| F | Iraq |
The United States-British invasion of
Iraq in 2003 overthrew the authoritarian and secular regime of Saddam Hussein
(see U.S.-Iraq War). The ouster of Hussein, who had long repressed Shia
Muslims in Iraq, gave breathing space for the Islamist parties known as the
Da`Wa Party and the Supreme Council of the Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI).
These two parties joined with other mainly fundamentalist Shia parties to form
the United Iraqi Alliance (UIA). The UIA established warm relations with the
clerical regime in Iran.
In Iraqi legislative elections held in
December 2006, the UIA gained the single largest bloc of seats, with 128 out of
275. The Kurdish Alliance, which was allied with the UIA, won 53 seats, leaving
the Shia and the Kurds only three seats shy of the two-thirds majority needed to
elect a president and push through constitutional reforms. Among Sunni Muslims
in Iraq, the fundamentalist religious coalition, the Iraqi Accord Front, did
best, winning 44 seats.
The deputy leader of the Shia Da`Wa
Party, Nouri al-Maliki, became Iraq’s prime minister in May 2006. Kurdish leader
Jalal Talabani was elected to the largely ceremonial post of president, becoming
the first non-Arab to lead an Arab country. From early 2007 al-Maliki’s
government met with increased confrontation from the Medhi Army, the strongest
Shia militia in Iraq. Led by young, radical cleric Moqtada Sadr, the Medhi Army
was accused of inciting sectarian violence against Sunni targets and against
U.S.-led forces. However, al-Maliki was reluctant to take action against the
militias because he relied on Sadr’s influence and political support to maintain
power. Unlike Sunni insurgents, Sadr was involved in the political process and
controlled 30 seats in the Shia bloc that dominates the Iraqi parliament.
| G | Pakistan |
Pakistan moved toward greater Islamization
of state and society under General Zia ul-Haq, the country’s president from 1978
to 1988. A side effect of Pakistan’s Islamization was increased conflict between
different religious communities and organizations, especially between the Sunni
Muslim majority and the Shia Muslim minority. Although anti-Shia sentiment had
existed in Pakistan, the 1990s saw a dramatic upsurge of religious radicalism
and violence. Armed with automatic weapons and explosives, militant Sunni
organizations fought equally militant Shia organizations.
During this period of religious violence,
Pakistan, long regarded as a stable ally of the United States, became a training
ground for guerrilla warriors and Islamic terrorists. The Soviet Union had
invaded Afghanistan in 1979, and a ten-year Soviet-Afghan War followed. Afghan
rebels set up camp in Pakistan, where Muslims from other countries joined them
to train as guerrillas. Known as mujahideen, the guerrillas were regarded
as freedom fighters in their campaign against Soviet forces, and they received
substantial financial and military assistance from the United States, Saudi
Arabia, and other countries throughout the 1980s. After the war ended with
Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan in 1989, many of the mujahideen returned home
to such countries as Algeria, Egypt, and Pakistan. There they contributed to the
spread of radical Islam. Others remained in Afghanistan and Pakistan.
Pakistan’s military, Islamized under Zia,
supported the mujahideen. The military developed close ties with the Taliban
(the movement that controlled most of Afghanistan from 1996 until November 2001)
and with militant Pakistani groups. So did many of Pakistan’s madrasas
(religious seminaries). Pakistan and Afghanistan together supported the
mujahideen in their struggle against India in Kashmir, disputed territory
claimed by both Pakistan and India.
In a bloodless coup in 1999, Pervez
Musharraf seized power as president of Pakistan and chief of its army staff.
During parliamentary elections in 2002 Musharraf formed an alliance with a
coalition of six hardline Islamic parties known as the Muthida Majlis-e-Amal
(MMA; United Council of Action). Until the 2002 election, the religious parties
had never won more than 5 percent of the total vote in the country, but their
alliance with Musharraf in 2002 brought them 11 percent of the vote. With 50
seats, the MMA became the second-largest opposition party in Pakistan. The MMA
parted ways with Musharraf in 2005 after he ordered the army to attack tribal
lands along Pakistan’s border with Afghanistan. Some of the Islamist political
parties in the borderlands, which receive support from the tribes, were
supposedly “hosting” members of Al-Qaeda.
After a U.S. invasion toppled the Taliban
in Afghanistan in 2001, Musharraf provided critical support to the U.S. war on
terrorism and aid in the effort to capture Osama bin Laden. As a result,
however, Musharraf became labeled an “American puppet” in Pakistan, where
anti-Americanism has steadily increased on account of the war in neighboring
Afghanistan. In October 2006 Pakistanis erupted in outrage after Pakistan’s
military bombed a madrasa (Islamic school) near the Afghan border,
killing at least 80 people. Musharraf also came under criticism from the United
States and Afghanistan for allegedly providing refuge for the Taliban.
| H | Palestine |
The political views of Palestinians in
the Israeli-occupied territories of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip have long
been regarded as primarily secular and nationalist. But Islamist groups, such as
Islamic Jihad and Hamas, have won popular support. Hamas was influenced by the
Muslim Brotherhood, and like the Muslim Brotherhood, it provided social
services. Hamas rejected the Oslo accords that established the Palestinian
National Authority (PNA) and gave hope for a two-state solution to resolve the
Israeli-Palestinian conflict. For a long time it continued to wage terrorist
attacks against Israel while the Fatah leadership of the PNA sought to enforce a
cease-fire with Israel and continue negotiations for a Palestinian state.
In elections for the Palestinian
Legislative Council in 2006, Hamas won a surprising victory, claiming 76 of the
132 seats and emerging as the dominant political force. Many political
observers, however, believed that Hamas’s showing was largely a rejection of
Fatah’s corruption and inefficient administration rather than an embrace of
militant Islam. Fatah, which had dominated Palestinian politics since the 1960s,
won only 43 seats in the legislative elections. Signs of Palestinians’
dissatisfaction with Fatah had been visible for years, and its alleged
misappropriation of funds only intensified the discontent of Palestinians.
After Hamas’s election to government in
2006, sanctions by Western countries crippled the Palestinian economy. The
United States froze its aid package, and the European Union (EU) followed suit.
Israel refused to release taxes and custom duties collected from Palestinians on
behalf of the PNA. The Palestinian government’s bankruptcy created a volatile
situation that soon led to clashes between Hamas and Fatah supporters. Fighting
in late 2006 and early 2007 left 90 Palestinians dead and the government in
complete chaos.
Saudi Arabia’s king Abdullah brokered a
peace agreement between Hamas and Fatah in Mecca in February 2007. The agreement
called for Hamas to abide by previous PNA agreements with Israel, including
Israel’s rights to its pre-1967 borders, which Hamas agreed to respect. The
United States and the EU withheld judgment on the peace accord. Fighting between
Hamas and Fatah militias in June 2007 left Gaza under the control of Hamas and
the West Bank under Fatah control. Palestinian Authority president and Fatah
leader Mahmoud Abbas dissolved the power-sharing government with his rivals in
Hamas and set up a Fatah-led administration to govern the West Bank. The United
States, EU, and Israel moved quickly to recognize the new government and offer
aid to the West Bank while continuing to withhold recognition and aid from the
democratically elected Hamas government in Gaza.
| I | Lebanon |
Hezbollah is the most powerful political
and military organization of Shia Muslims in Lebanon. It was formed in response
to Israel’s invasion of Lebanon in 1982 and the subsequent 18-year Israeli
occupation of southern Lebanon. As a political party with a popular base, it
holds seats in parliament and in the Lebanese cabinet. It also provides a wide
range of social services. At the same time, it is a resistance movement that the
United States has labeled as a terrorist organization. Hezbollah’s military
wing, the Islamic Resistance, has highly trained and motivated fighters.
Hezbollah earned broad-based support
among Lebanese after Israel withdrew from southern Lebanon in 2000, as
Hezbollah’s attacks on the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) were widely perceived as
responsible for the pullout. The Israeli withdrawal also vindicated, in the
minds of Hezbollah’s supporters, the tactical use of violence and suicide
bombing. Further vindication came during a 34-day war with Israel in 2006.
Israel launched a military offensive
against Lebanon in July 2006 in retaliation for a Hezbollah raid on the IDF.
Hezbollah responded to Israeli air strikes on Lebanon with rocket attacks
targeting cities in northern Israel. After 34 days of intense warfare, the U.N.
Security Council called for a cease-fire. Hezbollah’s leader, Hassan Nasrallah,
declared a strategic victory over Israel and emerged as the most popular figure
in the Middle East.
Lebanon found itself under the threat of
a civil war early in 2007. In January, Hezbollah and its allies in parliament,
including several Christian factions, called a general strike against the
government, demanding early elections and a greater share of power. Clashes
between Sunnis and Shias on the streets of Beirut, Lebanon’s capital, led
Hezbollah and its allies to call off the strike, fearing it might unleash an
unstoppable sectarian war. Sunni-Shia tensions escalated sharply in the
polarizing Lebanese political crisis.
| J | Turkey |
A secular republic, Turkey has a
strategic location as the bridge between Europe and Asia that makes the country
a significant player in global politics. With a fast-growing economy and a
rising population, Turkey has emerged as an important trade and investment
partner in the global market. It also is significant militarily, with the
second-largest army in NATO. Above all, Turkey stands out as an example of a
predominantly Muslim country that is a thriving democracy and a secular
republic—a model that political analysts say the West should encourage.
Turkey experimented with Islamic
political parties during the 1970s and 1980s but eventually outlawed all of
them. Necmettin Erbakan founded several Islamist parties that were banned but in
1996 and 1997 served as Turkey’s first Islamist prime minister. Erbakan’s
policies alienated Turkey’s secular political elites and he was forced to step
down by the military in 1997 after his coalition government fell apart.
Reformists who were disenchanted by Erbakan’s anti-Western policies broke off
from his latest Islamist party in 2001 and formed an independent party, the
Justice and Development Party (AKP).
The landslide victory of the AKP in 2002
parliamentary elections reflected a drastic shift in Turkey’s political
landscape. The AKP, a party with strong religious roots, albeit not an Islamist
party, won a huge overall majority in parliament, replacing three parties and
nearly all the former political heavyweights. The AKP won 363 seats, just four
short of the plurality needed to rewrite the constitution drawn up by generals
after an army coup in 1980. The election of an overwhelmingly pro-Islamic
parliament and prime minister in the Muslim world’s only strongly secular state
seemed astonishing.
Turkey’s new government pushed through
some significant reforms, dramatically weakening the political power of the
military, the proclaimed guardians of the country’s secular constitution, and
granting limited amnesty to Kurdish militants. The parliament stripped the
National Security Council of executive powers and put it under civilian control
in 2004. By bolstering democratic government, that reform advanced Turkey’s
chances of joining the European Union. The government walked a fine line in
seeking to appease Turkey’s secular elites as well as its increasingly popular
Islamic groups.
| K | Afghanistan |
Although Afghanistan’s mujahideen
succeeded in driving out Soviet occupation forces in 1988 and 1989, their
victory did not bring peace to Afghanistan. The rebels ousted Afghanistan’s
central government in 1992, but civil war then broke out among factions within
the mujahideen. The shared Islamic identity that had served to inspire,
mobilize, and unify the mujahideen in their jihad against the Soviet Union was
eclipsed by Afghanistan’s age-old tribal, ethnic, and religious (Sunni-Shia)
differences and rivalries.
| K1 | Rise of the Taliban |
A new militia, Taliban, first appeared
in late 1994 and subsequently swept across Afghanistan, uniting 90 percent of
the country under its rule and declaring the Islamic State of Afghanistan in
1996. Taliban, which means “group of madrasa students,” included many veterans
of the Soviet-Afghan War (1979-1989) who had returned to the madrasas after the
departure of the Soviet troops. Although portrayed as seminary students with no
military background, they were in fact a highly trained force.
The Taliban were initially hailed as
liberators who secured towns, made the streets safe for ordinary citizens, and
cleaned up corruption and graft. But they also imposed puritanical doctrines.
The Taliban barred women from school and the workplace, required that men wear
beards and women the full-length all-enveloping chador, banned music and
television, and imposed strict physical punishments on those who deviated from
these policies.
The Pashtun, Afghanistan’s dominant
ethnic group, dominated the Taliban. Using religion for legitimacy, the Pashtun
Taliban fought “holy” wars to subdue other ethnic and Muslim groups in
Afghanistan. The Taliban’s intolerance led to the slaughter of many of
Afghanistan’s Shia minority, whom the Taliban disdained as heretics. Many Muslim
religious leaders denounced the Taliban’s policies as too extreme and a
deviation from Islam. Muslim governments as diverse as Iran’s and Egypt’s
condemned the Taliban’s violations of human rights, as did Western governments
and international human rights organizations.
The Taliban brand of Islam produced a
“jihad culture” of Islamic radicalism and revolution. The classical Islamic
belief that jihad is a defense of Islam and the Muslim community against
aggression was transformed into a militant worldview that targeted Muslims and
non-Muslims alike. This worldview fed off political fragmentation and economic
failures, as well as religious and ethnic differences and conflicts. Many groups
that embraced the jihad culture received support from Saudi Arabia. With the
funding came the influence of Saudi Arabia’s ultraconservative Wahhabi reform
movement, which promotes a narrow, militant worldview.
Afghanistan under the Taliban provided
a sanctuary and training ground for young Islamic rebels in Southeast and
Central Asia. The effects were felt from Chechnya, an autonomous republic in
Russia, to Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region in China. Afghanistan also provided
a haven for Osama bin Laden, the Saudi-born veteran of the Soviet-Afghan War,
and his export of global terrorism.
| K2 | Osama bin Laden and Global Terrorism |
Attacks on the World Trade Center in
New York City and the Pentagon in Arlington, Virginia, on September 11, 2001,
provided a grim reminder of Osama bin Laden’s reputation as the godfather of
global terrorism. The Afghanistan-based millionaire and his umbrella
organization of international terrorist groups, al-Qaeda, were soon identified
as the prime suspects in the attacks. Intelligence analysts have linked bin
Laden and al-Qaeda to a series of attacks, many of them in his self-declared
jihad against the United States.
American intelligence experts regard
Osama bin Laden as a major funder of terrorist groups involved in the following
attacks: firefight in Somalia in 1993 that left 18 Americans dead; bombing of a
military training center run by the United States in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, in
1995; bombing of the Khobar Towers, an apartment complex that housed U.S.
servicemen in Dhahran, Saudi Arabia, in 1996; the killing of 58 tourists at
Luxor, Egypt, in 1997; bombings of U.S. embassies in Tanzania and Kenya in 1998;
and an attack against the USS Cole while it refueled in Yemen in 2000. He
has admitted his complicity in the attacks in Somalia; expressed his admiration
for the “heroes” responsible for the Riyadh and Dhahran bombings, while denying
his involvement; threatened attacks against Americans who remain on Saudi soil;
and promised retaliation internationally for cruise missile attacks. In 1998 he
announced the creation of a transnational coalition of extremist groups known as
The Islamic Front for Jihad against Jews and Crusaders.
After the September 11 attacks, the
United States declared a war on terrorism to capture bin Laden, destroy al-Qaeda
training bases in Afghanistan, and replace the Taliban with a government less
friendly to terrorists. Aerial bombing attacks destroyed al-Qaeda bases and
helped a coalition of anti-Taliban forces called the Northern Alliance gain
control of Afghanistan. The whereabouts of bin Laden, however, remained
unknown.
Osama bin Laden’s message resonates
with the feelings of many in the Arab and Muslim world. A sharp critic of U.S.
policy toward the Muslim world, bin Laden has denounced U.S. support for Israel,
which he blames for the failure of the Middle East peace process. He has
condemned U.S. refusal to censure Israel’s 1996 shelling of civilians in Qana,
Lebanon, and U.S. insistence on continued economic sanctions against Iraq, which
resulted in hundreds of thousands of deaths, especially among children. He has
been equally critical of what he dismisses as “new crusades” in the Persian
Gulf, in particular the substantial U.S. military and economic presence and
involvement in Saudi Arabia. He has embraced populist causes such as the
“liberation” of Muslims in Bosnia, Chechnya, Kashmir, Kosovo, and other
areas.
Bin Laden and other Islamic extremists
justify their use of violence with the claim that most Muslim and Western
governments are corrupt oppressors that resort to violence and terrorism. These
extremists use Islam to motivate their followers and rationalize their actions.
However, they misinterpret and misapply Islamic beliefs. Claiming that Islam and
the Muslim world are under siege, they call for a jihad. Although jihad refers
to the right and duty of Muslims to defend themselves, their community, and
their religion from unjust attack, extremists use the concept to legitimate acts
of violence and terrorism.
| L | Post-9/11 Terrorism |
In the wake of the September 11, 2001,
attacks, terrorist bombings took place in Morocco, the Philippines, Indonesia,
Saudi Arabia, Jordan, and Turkey. The groups responsible for the attacks had
loose ties or no ties to al-Qaeda. Madrid, Spain, and London, England, were the
targets of the deadliest terrorist attacks against Western countries following
September 11. On March 11, 2004, a chain of suicide bombs exploded on commuter
trains in Madrid at the height of the morning rush hour, killing 191 people and
wounding more than 1,500. The militant Moroccan group blamed for the bombings in
Casablanca in May 2003 was charged with responsibility for the Madrid terrorist
attacks. Although there is uncertainty regarding the group’s origin, it is
widely believed to be linked to al-Qaeda and operating in Belgium, Denmark,
Egypt, France, Morocco, Spain, Turkey, and the United Kingdom.
On July 7, 2005, a series of bombings on
three London subway trains and a double-decker bus during the morning rush hour
killed 56 people and wounded more than 700 others. Four young Britons, who led
seemingly ordinary lives, carried out the attacks. Their relationship with
al-Qaeda remained unclear. However, one year after the bombings, the al-Jazeera
television network showed a videotaped message from one of the suicide bombers,
Mohammad Sidique Khan, on the same tape as al-Qaeda's Ayman al-Zawahri, who
praised the London bombings. Khan said that he was “a soldier” who had given up
his life for his beliefs and was inspired by Osama bin Laden.
Jordan became a prime target for al-Qaeda
because it is used as a base for Westerners who fly in and out of Iraq for work.
Four al-Qaeda suicide bombers from western Iraq attacked two wedding parties in
Amman, Jordan, in November 2005, killing 57 people and wounding nearly 100.
Al-Qaeda’s leader in Iraq, Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, who was of Jordanian origin (he
was killed near Baghdad in 2006), claimed responsibility for the terrorist
attacks.
Saudi Arabia also became the target of
terrorist attacks after 9/11. In May 2003 al-Qaeda operatives in Saudi Arabia
attacked a housing compound, killing 34 people, including 8 Americans. In 2004
al-Qaeda struck Saudi Arabia again, launching suicide attacks in downtown Riyadh
in April and on the U.S. consulate in Jiddah in November. Osama bin Laden has
listed the presence of U.S. troops in Saudi Arabia as one of the motives for his
jihad against the United States and Saudi Arabia. However, the threat of
terrorism has led to greater cooperation between the two countries.
Al-Qaeda took responsibility for attacks
in Istanbul, Turkey, in November 2003. Car bombs exploded near two synagogues,
the British consulate, and a British bank. Casablanca, Morocco, became the scene
of a deadly terrorist attack in May 2003 that was blamed on a radical group,
Salafia Jihadia, which is allegedly linked to al-Qaeda.
Abu Sayyaf, a militant group in the
Philippines, has carried out terrorist attacks since the early 1990s with the
aim of establishing an independent Islamic state on the island of Jolo. These
attacks include kidnappings, murders, robberies, and bombings. The United States
believes that Abu Sayyaf has links to al-Qaeda. Indonesia experienced its
deadliest act of terrorism in recent history in 2002, when terrorists attacked
nightclubs, killing more than 200 people, most of them tourists. Since then
terrorists have struck Indonesia a number of times.
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